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Concrete Realism and Euthanasia: 
Some Reflections on Lisa Sowle Cahill's 
~~ Natural Law Reconsideration 
of Euthanasia" 
Robert J. Comiskey 
The author received a doctorate in religion and ethics from Emory 
University, Atlanta, Ga. and a doctorate in sacred theology from Gre-
gorian University in Rome. He is currently a post-doctoral senior 
fellow in residence in theology and medical ethics at the Institute of 
Religion, Texas Medical Center, Houston. 
A recent article by Lisa Sowle Cahill ("A Natural Law Reconsidera-
tion of Euthanasia," Linacre Quarterly, February, 1977) was preceded 
by a brief statement in which the author and publisher invited com-
ment on her consideration of this important topic . The following 
reflections are a brief response to that article. They are made with 
similar tentativeness, as this author also recognizes that the issue is far 
from settled. 
Having carefully read Ms. Cahill's article, I find myself agreeing 
with her conclusion, viz., that there are circumstances where direct 
euthanasia could be a moral option, while at the same time, I feel that 
her presentation failed to come to grips with the most important 
specific concerns in this area, as well as stretching a principle to the 
point where it ceases to have much meaning. In the latter instance, I 
am referring to the principle of totality. In Pius XII 's utilization of 
this principle, it is most certainly true that he was interested in both 
the physical and spiritual good of the whole person. Hence individual 
organs could be subordinated to the spiritual end of the person (p. 
49). However, what was most central in the application of this prin-
ciple was not subordination to specific ends as such, but rather subor-
dination of the part to the whole. 
In the euthanasia instance, one is not really talking about subordin-
ation of a part, but rather the destruction of the whole. One is not 
simply sacrificing a physical organism but the whole person. While 
biological life is not an absolute value , its total absence (as in the case 
of euthanasia) means, in fact, the cessation of the person. Persons are 
embodied beings. A failure to recognize this leads to a type of Car-
tesian dualism that one would hope is gone forever . Ms. Cahill writes, 
"The intention of the principle of totality is to respect and safeguard 
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the integrity and welfare of the whole human being." (p. 49). I would 
hasten to add that what was also intended by the principle of totality 
was that its application be in situations which were life-saving. Other 
situations where there was the possibility or actuality of death were 
covered more properly by the principle of double effect. To speak 
about sacrificing the total bodily existence for the sake of the whole 
person makes little sense in terms of contemporary theological or 
philosophical an thropology. 
Instead of taking the route of trying to discuss this issue under the 
aspects of the principle of totality, one is certainly better off centering 
the debate on the principle of double effect, which has had a meaning-
ful application in this regard, and is currently undergoing some re-
examination. In Ms. Cahill's discussion of this principle, I would agree 
that the innocence or guilt of the aggressor is not the most appropriate 
context for discussing this principle (pp. 54-56). The crucial question 
was not the innocence or guilt, but rather the fact of the material 
aggression itself, viz., the threat to life. Furthermore, the most impor-
tant element of this principle was the fourth condition, i.e., propor-
tionate reason. And a crucial element of that condition was the ques-
tion of short or long range consequences of such actions. Ms. Cahill 
cites Richard McCormick's objection to euthanasia (footnote 41) and 
asserts that" . .. the telling point in arguments for and against eutha-
nasia is whether one believes that the future danger is so probable and 
so serious that it outweighs harm done or permitted in the present 
instance, or whether it in fact represents the lesser evil. Such an esti-
mation is more a product of moral insight into human nature and 
moral responsibility than of rational deduction with probative 
force .... " 
I would agree that the formal structure of the debate will center on 
the balancing of potential good for the patient and possible harm to 
others. However, while Ms. Cahill recognizes this when she writes, 
"There may exist a positive duty to support his desire to die, if no 
conflict exists with other overriding rights and duties ," (p. 56) she 
does not spell out what those rights and duties might be. And this is at 
the center of all discussions on euthanasia. In other words, while 
centering on the crux of the problem in a formal way, she is not very 
helpful in fleshing out the material content of such rights and duties. 
What rights and duties are most crucial to the personal and social 
dimensions of euthanasia decisions? One must get down to specifics, 
or be lost in abstractions. It is the specific issue of balancing particular 
rights and duties that has become the focus of the debate today. This 
is borne out by looking at contemporary constitutional law discus-
sions on the issue. The question here is not whether one might posi-
tively support a person's desire to die, but rather on the specific 
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reasons why the law has traditionally prohibited direct euthanasia. 
Some of these reasons are certainly paternalistic (protecting the per-
son against a possible wrong decision), but the strongest arguments are 
those which look to the possible consequences for those either im-
mediately or remotely related to euthanasia decisions. One finds argu-
ments against the introduction of the principle of direct euthanasia 
into law, as well as arguments directed against specific problems in its 
implementation. In the former category, one needs to assess issues 
such as whether there is still a need for euthanasia due to advances in 
pain-killing drugs, the effects upon patient-physician relationship, etc. 
In the latter category, one ought to consider if and how abuses can 
be prevented, e.g., extending euthanasia from voluntary situations to 
involuntary ones, etc . It is only by addressing these specific issues that 
one can really get handles on the significance of the euthanasia ques-
tion. And while, "such an estimation is more a product of moral 
insight than of rational deduction with probative force," one does 
need to assess moral insight and moral responsibility by considering 
the actual experience of "human nature" by seriously considering the 
history of moral experience in this regard. One good starting point for 
looking at this experience is through actual cases as they have been 
handled in civil law. This is not the only starting point. But at least 
one remains empirically grounded, and is able to get to the specifics, 
approaching the issue with concrete realism. 
In summary, I would agree with Ms. Cahill that one can construct a 
good case for the approval of direct euthanasia in exceptional cases. I 
would also contend that most, if not all of the major consequentialist 
objections to this practice can be sufficiently answered so as to war-
rant its possibility. But it is these concrete objections that one must 
consider if the discussion is to be moved forward. While Ms. Cahill has 
been helpful in summarizing the developments in a formal way, she 
has not been very helpful in fleshing out that skeletal framework with 
concrete realism grounded in the actual practice of those most closely 
involved in euthanasia decisions. 
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